Germany Seeks Influence by Setting Example of Being a Multilateral Team Player on Aid Effectiveness

By Hans Dembowski

After the 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, an African delegate suggested to Germany’s development minister that now might be a good time to sort out the agencies working on her behalf. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul burst into a friendly laugh, saying she knew that something had to be done. She promised that before next September’s German elections, a new institutional structure would spare recipient countries of Germany’s development aid the confusion of having to deal with GTZ (German Technical Cooperation) on some occasions, KfW Development Bank on others, and smaller agencies on yet other occasions.

Indeed, the institutional landscape of German state-run development agencies can be bewildering. Apart from GTZ and KfW, several other organizations launched by various German governments in the 1960s and 1970s deliver various forms of aid. Back then, Germany’s international engagement went through a period of rapid growth, while an economic boom allowed governments to spend with relatively little restraint.

Under Wieczorek-Zeul, however, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ, short for “Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung”) has started to trim down this multitude of aid bodies, while also pushing its component parts towards stronger coordination.

For instance, Carl-Duisberg-Gesellschaft and Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Entwicklung, were merged and became InWEnt. DEG (Deutsche Entwicklungs- und Investitionsgesellschaft), a bank that finances private-sector investments in developing countries, became a subsidiary of KfW Banking Group, the parent of the development bank. Experts from all separate agencies now constitute “country groups” with the task of streamlining operations.

In the same vein, the role of BMZ officers assigned to German embassies in developing countries has grown to include, among others, coordinating the activity of German agencies, many of which now share offices in those countries. This has coincided with a reorganization of BMZ itself.

In Germany as elsewhere, bureaucracies resist change, and the BMZ’s administrative reform agenda was never popular in the affected agencies. Nonetheless, grumbling among aid officials does not enlist much public sympathy. Traditional constituencies for development—non-governmental organizations and churches—focus their public campaigns on increasing the amount of development assistance, and pushing for debt relief or a fair world-trade regime. They do not stress administrative issues.

The reforms within German development aid architecture are best understood in the context of German multilateralism. Debt relief in the late 1990s, the Millennium Summit in 2000, the Monterrey Summit on Financing for Development in 2002 and the High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness in Rome, Paris and Accra all left their marks. It became obvious that the operations of German development agencies were too cumbersome. Like it or not, these agencies had to start acting in a more coherent manner under more assertive political guidance.

The structural reform imperative reflects the German government’s strategic approach to a globalized world. As Germany aspires to “shape globalization”—a phrase cited frequently by Wieczorek-Zeul and Chancellor Angela Merkel—there is a recognition that the country must behave as a good global citizen. In other words, it must allow itself to be shaped by globalization.

Wieczorek-Zeul understood this circular logic early on. After taking office in 1998, she teamed up with development ministers from Britain, Norway and the Netherlands in the Utstein Group. Together, they successfully argued the case for international debt relief, for instance. That momentum reinforced Wieczorek-Zeul’s standing at home.

BMZ is still a comparatively small department of the Federal Government. Historically, it never had much clout, but it is stronger today than ever before. Its budget has almost doubled in the past decade, allowing Germany to surpass Japan and become the world’s second largest bilateral donor in absolute terms behind the USA.

An example of how an international trend can have an impact at the cabinet level lies in the MDGs and Germany’s Action Programme 2015 to halve world poverty. This program was passed within months after the Millennium Summit, spelling out that the fight against poverty is an international obligation and that the Federal Republic will do its part. Moreover, the program emphasized areas in which the BMZ’s engagement was already well-established, including pro-poor private-sector growth, social security, rural reform and women’s rights. At the same time, the program committed to acting in favor of debt relief, a development-friendly regime for world trade and the peaceful resolution of conflict.

This program fit in well with the centre-left ideologies of the Social Democrat and Green parties that formed the federal government at the beginning of this decade. No doubt, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer understood that their government’s engagement in international development would please their sometimes fractious pacifist base. Still, development remained a supposedly “soft” issue for “do-gooders” that never gained much traction in the federal cabinet. Poverty on far-away continents is not a vote-getter at election time.

And yet, influenced by the MDGs, the cabinet decided to implement an action program with the goal of halving poverty worldwide. Wieczorek-Zeul proved adept at using such opportunities. BMZ was assigned jurisdiction and given cross-cutting say in all government programs with any impact on world poverty. It was thus assigned a role for the whole of government.

While neither Schröder nor Fischer were much moved by save-the-world idealism, both had an eye for political opportunity. They knew that multilateral organizations and intergovernmental decision-making were settings in which Germany could exercise influence on international issues. Germany had to prove a worthy member of the United Nations if, as Schröder aspired, the country was ever to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Partly as a result of its 20th-century history, Germany’s leaders approach foreign policy differently from those of Britain or the United States. German leaders are comfortable with the pooling of sovereignty, as this openness to multilaterist initiatives allowed what was then West Germany to restore its status as a respected player on the world stage after the historic disasters of Nazi dictatorship and the Second World War.

The starting point was close cooperation with France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and Italy, in what was eventually to become the European Union. Initially, the idea was to draft joint policies in militarily relevant areas, so that each partner would always have intimate knowledge of what the others were up to. Pooled sovereignty and the common market turned out tremendously successful, both in terms of securing peace and promoting prosperity in the long run.

After 1945, it was easy for the German leadership to concede sovereignty—it didn’t, after all, enjoy any. The Federal Republic was occupied by the Allied forces. Over the years, Western partners slowly accepted West Germany into their fold as a relevant player despite this lack of sovereignty, which was de jure resolved only after German reunification. The Federal Republic’s history was one of ceding its compromised sovereign control at the national level in order to gain influence at the supranational level.

For the Federal Republic of Germany, adapting to international demands while contributing to multilateral decision making has become a kind of raison d’etre. This approach is selfevident to the German public. Foreign governments that do not adopt this approach are thus considered unenlightened or even arrogant.

The approach certainly works well for the BMZ. In international development discourse, this still comparatively small department of Germany’s Federal Government, has become a heavyweight. A striking example is the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy. It was passed in May 2007, when Germany held the EU presidency. Among other things, the code of conduct spells out that:

• member states should limit their activities in developing countries to three sectors;
• no more than five EU members should be active in any given sector;
• at least one EU member should be active in every poverty-relevant sector in the partner countries.

In addition, involvement of member states in promoting civil society, improving governance and budget support is considered valuable.

It is noteworthy that the concept reflects reforms already implemented at the BMZ and its various agencies. Germany’s initiative has thus had an impact on the pan-European approach.

Hans Dembowski is the editor of the Frankfurt-based monthly D+C Development and Cooperation.

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