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After the 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, an African delegate
suggested to Germany’s development minister that now might be a good time
to sort out the agencies working on her behalf. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul burst
into a friendly laugh, saying she knew that something had to be done. She promised
that before next September’s German elections, a new institutional structure
would spare recipient countries of Germany’s development aid the confusion
of having to deal with GTZ (German Technical Cooperation) on some occasions,
KfW Development Bank on others, and smaller agencies on yet other occasions.
Indeed, the institutional landscape of German state-run development agencies
can be bewildering. Apart from GTZ and KfW, several other organizations launched
by various German governments in the 1960s and 1970s deliver various forms of
aid. Back then, Germany’s international engagement went through a period
of rapid growth, while an economic boom allowed governments to spend with relatively
little restraint.
Under Wieczorek-Zeul, however, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development (BMZ, short for “Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung”) has started to trim down this multitude
of aid bodies, while also pushing its component parts towards stronger coordination.
For instance, Carl-Duisberg-Gesellschaft and Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale
Entwicklung, were merged and became InWEnt. DEG (Deutsche Entwicklungs- und
Investitionsgesellschaft), a bank that finances private-sector investments in
developing countries, became a subsidiary of KfW Banking Group, the parent of
the development bank. Experts from all separate agencies now constitute “country
groups” with the task of streamlining operations.
In the same vein, the role of BMZ officers assigned to German embassies in
developing countries has grown to include, among others, coordinating the activity
of German agencies, many of which now share offices in those countries. This
has coincided with a reorganization of BMZ itself.
In Germany as elsewhere, bureaucracies resist change, and the BMZ’s
administrative reform agenda was never popular in the affected agencies. Nonetheless,
grumbling among aid officials does not enlist much public sympathy. Traditional
constituencies for development—non-governmental organizations and churches—focus
their public campaigns on increasing the amount of development assistance, and
pushing for debt relief or a fair world-trade regime. They do not stress administrative
issues.
The reforms within German development aid architecture are best understood
in the context of German multilateralism. Debt relief in the late 1990s, the
Millennium Summit in 2000, the Monterrey Summit on Financing for Development
in 2002 and the High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness in Rome, Paris and Accra
all left their marks. It became obvious that the operations of German development
agencies were too cumbersome. Like it or not, these agencies had to start acting
in a more coherent manner under more assertive political guidance.
The structural reform imperative reflects the German government’s strategic
approach to a globalized world. As Germany aspires to “shape globalization”—a
phrase cited frequently by Wieczorek-Zeul and Chancellor Angela Merkel—there
is a recognition that the country must behave as a good global citizen. In other
words, it must allow itself to be shaped by globalization.
Wieczorek-Zeul understood this circular logic early on. After taking office
in 1998, she teamed up with development ministers from Britain, Norway and the
Netherlands in the Utstein Group. Together, they successfully argued the case
for international debt relief, for instance. That momentum reinforced Wieczorek-Zeul’s
standing at home.
BMZ is still a comparatively small department of the Federal Government. Historically,
it never had much clout, but it is stronger today than ever before. Its budget
has almost doubled in the past decade, allowing Germany to surpass Japan and
become the world’s second largest bilateral donor in absolute terms behind
the USA.
An example of how an international trend can have an impact at the cabinet
level lies in the MDGs and Germany’s Action Programme 2015 to halve world
poverty. This program was passed within months after the Millennium Summit,
spelling out that the fight against poverty is an international obligation and
that the Federal Republic will do its part. Moreover, the program emphasized
areas in which the BMZ’s engagement was already well-established, including
pro-poor private-sector growth, social security, rural reform and women’s
rights. At the same time, the program committed to acting in favor of debt relief,
a development-friendly regime for world trade and the peaceful resolution of
conflict.
This program fit in well with the centre-left ideologies of the Social Democrat
and Green parties that formed the federal government at the beginning of this
decade. No doubt, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer understood that their government’s engagement in international
development would please their sometimes fractious pacifist base. Still, development
remained a supposedly “soft” issue for “do-gooders”
that never gained much traction in the federal cabinet. Poverty on far-away
continents is not a vote-getter at election time.
And yet, influenced by the MDGs, the cabinet decided to implement an action
program with the goal of halving poverty worldwide. Wieczorek-Zeul proved adept
at using such opportunities. BMZ was assigned jurisdiction and given cross-cutting
say in all government programs with any impact on world poverty. It was thus
assigned a role for the whole of government.
While neither Schröder nor Fischer were much moved by save-the-world
idealism, both had an eye for political opportunity. They knew that multilateral
organizations and intergovernmental decision-making were settings in which Germany
could exercise influence on international issues. Germany had to prove a worthy
member of the United Nations if, as Schröder aspired, the country was ever
to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Partly as a result of its 20th-century history, Germany’s leaders approach
foreign policy differently from those of Britain or the United States. German
leaders are comfortable with the pooling of sovereignty, as this openness to
multilaterist initiatives allowed what was then West Germany to restore its
status as a respected player on the world stage after the historic disasters
of Nazi dictatorship and the Second World War.
The starting point was close cooperation with France, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxemburg and Italy, in what was eventually to become the European Union. Initially,
the idea was to draft joint policies in militarily relevant areas, so that each
partner would always have intimate knowledge of what the others were up to.
Pooled sovereignty and the common market turned out tremendously successful,
both in terms of securing peace and promoting prosperity in the long run.
After 1945, it was easy for the German leadership to concede sovereignty—it
didn’t, after all, enjoy any. The Federal Republic was occupied by the
Allied forces. Over the years, Western partners slowly accepted West Germany
into their fold as a relevant player despite this lack of sovereignty, which
was de jure resolved only after German reunification. The Federal Republic’s
history was one of ceding its compromised sovereign control at the national
level in order to gain influence at the supranational level.
For the Federal Republic of Germany, adapting to international demands while
contributing to multilateral decision making has become a kind of raison d’etre.
This approach is selfevident to the German public. Foreign governments that
do not adopt this approach are thus considered unenlightened or even arrogant.
The approach certainly works well for the BMZ. In international development
discourse, this still comparatively small department of Germany’s Federal
Government, has become a heavyweight. A striking example is the EU Code of Conduct
on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy. It was passed
in May 2007, when Germany held the EU presidency. Among other things, the code
of conduct spells out that:
- member states should limit their activities in developing countries to
three sectors;
- no more than five EU members should be active in any given sector;
- at least one EU member should be active in every poverty-relevant sector
in the partner countries.
In addition, involvement of member states in promoting civil society, improving
governance and budget support is considered valuable.
It is noteworthy that the concept reflects reforms already implemented at
the BMZ and its various agencies. Germany’s initiative has thus had an
impact on the pan-European approach.
Hans Dembowski is the editor of the Frankfurt-based monthly D+C Development
and Cooperation.
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