In terms of the objectives of regulation and supervision,, the distinction between a single agency and multiple agency approach may not be great: neither structure assures effectiveness. Attempting to modify the existing structure can give rise to struggles among the agencies over the potential rearrangement of authorities and responsibilities that hinder achievement of the objective of devising an effective means to regulate and supervise financial conglomerates. Moreover, merging existing agencies, or creating a single new agency, requires political agreement on the branch of government to which the agency should report, on whether and to what extent the agency should be responsible to the central bank, and on the extent to which it should be independent. Achieving such agreement would be outside the scope of responsibility of most supervisory agencies. On the other hand, maintenance of the status quo may prove an impediment to achieving effective supervision, particularly where the different agencies are responsible to different governments {e.g. national and regional) or different bodies within government {e.g. executive, legislative and central bank) which may not share common objectives. The existing structure may be based on the supervision of different types of institutions whose functions increasing overlap, placing in doubt the continued validity of the supervisory structure. Finally, in the face of limited human and financial resources, maintaining multiple agencies simply may no longer be affordable.