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There are
diverse, competing, and frequently conflicting claims about the
advantages of creating semi-autonomous entities within the public
sector. Without a clearer understanding of what autonomization
can achieve and under what circumstances, the confusion
of claims is allowing a debate over form to precede a debate over
function. The consequence is that many autonomization adventures
have been well packaged but unproven, while others have been successful
but unsung.
Agencies
– a wrench placed in the machinery of government?
Autonomization
is not a new invention. Prior to the creation of Next Steps Agencies
in the UK there were between 1000 and 5000 non-Departmental public
bodies, state-owned enterprises, and health service providers.
Similarly, there is a long Latin American tradition of "decentralized"
entities (autonomous institutes, public enterprises, etc.). In
general, machinery of government changes
have taken place at an evolutionary rather than revolutionary
pace – and given the uncertainties around design and the risk
of errors this is probably appropriate. It appears, however, that
the autonomization debate may have altered this evolutionary path,
with autonomization emerging as a solution urgently in pursuit
of a problem.
Types
of agencies [
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It is possible
to distinguish two primary types of autonomization: type 1
agencies (agencies that act within the executive – typically
"executing agencies") and type 2 agencies (agencies
that act to restrain the executive – typically "statutory
commissions" or autonomous regulators). As arms-length instruments
of line ministries for policy implementation, type 1 agencies
are expected to improve operational efficiency in service delivery
areas through greater managerial discretion and flexibility with
relatively secure funding and organizational autonomy. Type 2
agencies, on the other hand, are designed to give statutory independence
to agencies in charge of functions that require protection from
politicians’ short-term orientations and capture by government
in turn, including long-term policy-making (e.g., monetary policy)
or quasi-judicial/regulatory functions. Within each type, agencies
can be more or less institutionalized. Institutionalized
agencies are subject to more deeply entrenched checks and balances,
and tend to form a class of agency rather than one-off. By contrast,
governments may create autonomous agencies as ad hoc responses
to respond to particular political problems, to protect priority
activities from opposing political influences, or to bypass the
low technical capacity of public sector personnel.
Relatively
little is known about the success factors behind sustainable and
effective agencies. Despite considerable managerialist rhetoric,
it seems improbable that intra-public sector contracts are a particularly
significant ingredient in type 1 agencies. Despite the celebration
of their success in the new public management reforms of New
Zealand and the UK, it is at least arguable that the result
owes more to the tradition of discipline within the civil service
than the particular nature of the contract with the agency. Experience
from State
Owned Enterprises is that performance contracts within the
public sector are rarely effective in constraining enterprise
behavior.
Externalities
and collateral damage
[
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Although the
case for and against agencies is generally made in relation to
the specific task of an agency, a broader examination may reveal
areas in which agencies have potentially deleterious impacts on
the public sector as a whole:
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Policy
Lock-In. Are autonomous agencies undermining policy
objectives by creating constituencies that will compel governments
to maintain existing policies? Agencies are created but rarely
closed or merged. Policy becomes what the agencies do, not
what the government proposes. This can also create unhealthy
institutional rivalry between the agency and the parent ministry
which is legally responsible for a given policy domain. In
dysfunctional bureaucracies where agencies are created to
circumvent the ineffectiveness of the traditional ministries,
it is often the case that agencies dominate de facto policy-making
at the detriment of the parent ministry. Since agencies commonly
lack formal mandate and authority for inter-agency policy
coordination, the dominance of an agency in a particular policy
domain could cause a serious problem of intra-government policy
coordination. The result is often a bureaucracy
that responds poorly to changing priorities.
-
Policy
Creep. Are autonomous agencies adopting quasi-fiscal
activities that stretch beyond the original policy intention
of government? Autonomous status can encourage agencies to
engage in quasi-fiscal activities (e.g., fee-based services,
special concessions to certain groups) that serve the same
role as taxes and subsidies, and exceed the original policy
intention of government.
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Budget
Balkanization. Are autonomous agencies undermining
the coherence
of the budget? Unchecked agency creation can destabilize
the budget in three ways. First, it can create an argument
for earmarked funding, which undermines the strategic ability
of government to shift funds to emerging priorities, thereby
leading to budgetary rigidities and over-stretched funding.
Second, it can create scenarios (a.k.a. "bleeding stump"
arguments) in which government must provide additional resources
or face the unthinkable — e.g., teachers on strike, nurses
without jobs, etc. The arms-length nature of agencies makes
"bleeding stump" arguments more likely since the
imminent problem is less easily identified by the central
agencies. Third, unchecked agency creation can create contingent
liabilities for government by borrowing against assets
or making other commitments.
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Patronage
Den. Are autonomous agencies facilitating patronage?
Unchecked agency creation can institutionalize patronage in
appointments if the agency becomes the implicit bailiwick
or property of a coalition party. This undermines the credibility
of merit protection regulations for all agencies by offering
a haven for patronage appointments. Particularly in governments
backed by unstable coalitions, autonomous agencies – with
the implicit promise of a distinct sphere of influence and
public profile – can provide an easy route for appeasing fractious
coalition members.
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Special
privileges. Are autonomous agencies distorting public
sector incentives? In order to attract qualified staff, autonomous
agencies are often given exceptions from the government personnel
regime to offer higher salary scales as well as other attractive
benefits. The uneven incentive structures within the public
sector make it difficult to lure competent individuals to
traditional ministries, while those who remain in the non-autonomous
parts of the government become unmotivated or even resentful
of those receiving better incentives and benefits in autonomous
agencies.
Implications
[
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Autonomization
is attractive to both reformers in countries and to donors because
it allows quick circumvention of a number of institutional dysfunctions
that plague public sectors in developing and transitional countries.
However, there are significant costs associated with inappropriate
autonomization. Therefore, benefits and costs should be weighed
in each concrete circumstance. A model of autonomization that
worked in one context may very well prove to be wholly inappropriate
in another setting. A key challenge is to remove the magic bullet
associations with autonomization, and restore it to its position
as one dimension of institutional design among many within the
public sector. The perennial issue when considering government
provision of goods and services is not "How can we use autonomization?"
The fundamental questions are "What is wrong with the present
arrangement?" and "What would successfully solve that
problem?"
The Public
Agencies International Research Network (PAIR-NET) is a ‘closed’
secure forum for exchanging research and practice among scholars
and practitioners active in ‘agency’ programs. It is part of a
wider program of activity on public agencies, including research,
conferences and workshops. Details are available at http://www.mailbase.ac.uk/lists/pair-net/.
Recommended
readings [
TOP ]
-
Axelrod,
Donald. 1992. The Rise of Shadow Government. New York:
Wiley.
-
Boston,
J., J. Martin, J. Pallot, and P. Walsh. 1996. Public Management:
the New Zealand Model. Aukland: Oxford University
Press.
-
Chancellor
of the Duchy of Lancaster. 1997. Next Steps Agencies in
Government - Review 1996. UK Cabinet Office, London.
-
Estache,
Antonio, and David Martimort. 1999. "Politics, Transaction
Costs, and the Design of Regulatory Institutions."
Policy
Research Working
Paper No. WPS 2073. Washington, D.C., World Bank.Fraser,
A. 1991.Making the Most of Next Steps: The Management of
Ministers’
Departments and their Executive Agencies. London: HMSO.
-
Keefer,
Philip, and David Stasavage. 2000. "Bureaucratic Delegation
and Political Institutions: When Are Independent Central Banks
Irrelevant?"
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2356. World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
-
Polidano,
Charles. 1997. "The
Bureaucrat Who Fell Under a Bus: Ministerial
Responsibility, Executive Agencies and the Derek Lewis Affair
in
Britain." Working Paper No. 1. IDEM Public Policy
and Management Series. [A revised version was published
in Governance 12(1), 1999.]
-
Schick,
Allen. 1998. "Why
Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New
Zealand Reforms." World Bank mimeo.
-
Scott,
Graham, and Irene Taylor. 2000. "Autonomous Public Organisations
in Thailand." Victoria Link mimeo, Wellington, New Zealand.
- World
Bank. 1995. "Contracting:
What Works, What Doesn’t and Why." In Bureaucrats
in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership.
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
This page
was prepared by Nick Manning
and Yasuhiko Matsuda
of the World Bank. It was submitted on 7/27/00.
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